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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case no. 20060509-CA

v.
JIMMIE BUTLER and
ANITA MAE BUTLER
Defendants/Appellants.
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

ARGUMENT
Point 1
I.

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL COUNSEL ASSISTANCE WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INTRODUCE A POWER OF
ATTORNEY GRANTING AUTHORITY FOR ELMER BUTLER'S
SPOUSE EDNA MAE BUTLER TO SIGN DOCUMENTS FOR HIM.
A. Defendants are not limited to a single theory of the case.

The defendants' claimed in their Brief of Appellant that their trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to introduce at trial the power of attorney from Elmer
Butler which granted Edna Mae Butler authority to sign his name on the deed in
question in the case. The State has argued in its brief that this assertion fails
because such a claim is inconsistent with the defendants' theory of the case - that
Elmer Butler signed the deed while intoxicated. (See Brief of Appellee at 10-12.)
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the testimony of Elmer Butler's
1

intoxication at the signing of the deed was not elicited by defense counsel and it
would be unfair to tie them to that theory to the exclusion of any other. The
prosecution witness Marilyn Goldberg testified that she heard Jimmie Butler say
that Elmer Butler signed the document when he was drunk. (R.463: 69) On crossexamination the defense witness Hollie Butler testified that her grandfather, Elmer
Butler, drank a great deal, was drinking when he signed the deed, and was
probably then drunk. (R.463: 184-185). If this is a contradiction to the theory that
Edna Butler could have signed for Elmer then it is one posed by the prosecution
and if anyone is to be limited to it then it is the State.
The second reason the argument fails is because there is no such
limitation of theories imposed upon defendants in criminal cases. The burden in
this case, as all criminal cases, is upon the state to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the defendants committed the crimes charged. The defense on the other
hand is permitted to present none to many alternatives to the prosecution's case.
If the defense presents multiple viable alternatives to the prosecutions case there
is no requirement that the alternatives presented be consistent with one another.
If any of the alternatives raises reasonable doubt about the prosecutions case
then the defense has succeeded.
B. The power of attorney document itself was not inconsistent with
the theory and witness testimony that Elmer Butler signed the
deed in question and strongly undermined any need for the
defendants to commit any crime.
The state argues in its brief that if the defense counsel had introduced at
trial the power of attorney from Elmer Butler granting Edna Mae Butler authority
2

to sign his name it would have "undermined his own theory of defense." (See
Brief of Appellee at 10.) This is the same erroneous argument Judge Eves made
in his denial of the defendants' motion to arrest judgment (See Brief of Appellee,
Addendum A, at 4) and again by Judge Walton in his denial of the defendants'
motion for a new trial. (See Brief of Appellee, Addendum B, at 3). As explained
following, the noted power of attorney is not inconsistent with the defense
witness' testimony that Elmer Butler had signed the deed himself while drunk.
The single most glaring deficiency in the performance of defense counsel
at trial was the fact he ignored completely an item of evidence which was
probably dispositive of the case. That item was the power of attorney from Elmer
Butler to Edna Mae Butler, (Addendum A)^ This document, signed by Elmer L.
Butler and notarized by Frank X. Gordon2 on December 8th, 1964, was also
recorded in the records of Mohave County the same day. This power of attorney
was never rescinded and was effective from its signing through April 23, 1999
(the date the deed in question in the instant case was notarized) and thereafter
up to the death of Edna Mae Butler.
The power of attorney granted Edna Mae Butler authority to, on behalf of
Elmer Butler, "sell, remise, release, convey ... lands upon such terms and
conditions ... as she shall think fit." The broad and comprehensive verbiage of
the document continues that Edna Butler is granted power "for and in my name
[Elmer Butler], and as my act and deed, to sign, seal, execute, deliver, and
1 A certified copy of which was entered into the trial court's file at arguments on the two post trial motions
which were denied.
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acknowledge .. deeds ... as may be necessary and proper...". It further grants
her "full power and authority to do and perform all and every act and thing
whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done ... as fully and to all intents and
purposes as I [Elmer Butler] might or could do if personally present".
The implications of this grant of power are obvious. Edna Mae Butler's
signature was on the deed at the center of this prosecution. She apparently
willingly conveyed, as her own agent, to Anita Butler the subject property. Her
signature was authenticated at trial by prosecution expert George Throckmorton.
(R.463: 120.) Her intent to convey the property is implicit by her signature on the
deed.
In denying the defendants' motion to arrest judgment the court noted that
the defendants had chosen as a theory of their case that Elmer Butler himself had
signed the deed while intoxicated, had presented that defense at trial, and the
jury had rejected their defense. (See Brief of Appellee, Addendum A, at 7.)
However, as argued foregoing in Section A, that is incorrect. Also, what the court
did not consider is that the presentation of the noted power of attorney at trial was
not in conflict with the theory presented. The defendants did not need to argue
that Edna Butler signed the deed for Elmer, they merely needed to argue that she
could have signed for him. This fact in connection with her own valid signature on
the deed very probably would have bolstered the testimony of the defense
witness Holly Butler who testified that Elmer had signed the deed.

2 Later Supreme Court Justice of the Arizona Supreme Court.
4

The most important thing Edna Butler's valid signature on the deed and a
power of attorney from Elmer Butler to Edna Butler does is raise the question:
What need would Jimmie and Anita Butler have to forge the deed?
Why would two intelligent people commit a serious felony to obtain
something they could probably get by simply asking Edna Butler for it? They have
no motive to commit a crime because Edna, who already was evidently a willing
signatory, could just as easily sign for Elmer as well. Why would the defendants'
lie about Elmer signing the deed when they didn't even need him to sign the
deed? Edna could just as easily have signed the deed for Elmer! There was
simply no need to forge. Its like robbing the bank to get your own money out rational, intelligent people with a pass book or ATM card simply do not do such
things.
This question of "why would the defendants commit a felony when they
apparently did not need to?" would in all probability have presented itself to the
jury if they had known of the power of attorney. The question certainly would have
presented itself to the jury if trial defense counsel had posed it. The question
would probably have significantly affected the balance in the jury's deliberations
and probably would have resulted in acquittal. It is not required of the defense to
demonstrate by a preponderance the result would have been different (see
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 LEd.2d 674,
reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267, 104 S.Ct. 3562, 82 L.Ed.2d 864 (1984)), but only "that a
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have
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been different." (See State v. Verde; 770 P.2d 116, citing State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d
909, 913 (Utah 1988)).
But trial defense counsel did not bring the power of attorney before the jury
and he did not pose the important question the document raised. His failure to do
so cannot be excused because, as the State argues in its brief, it "would have
effectively undermined his own theory of defense" (See Brief of Appellee at 10)
since, as argued foregoing, it does not undermine the defense. Nor can it be
excused by any possible reasonable trial tactic, strategy or other "rational basis"
(see State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)).This failure denied
the defendants effective assistance of counsel.
Point 2
II.

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL COUNSEL ASSISTANCE WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO INVESTIGATE CLAIMS OF
ELMER BUTLER'S DRINKING OR TO IMPEACH HIS
TESTIMONY.

In its brief, the State argues that defendants' trial counsel's failure to
investigate whether Elmer Butler signed the deed while intoxicated was
reasonable trial strategy because evidence of intoxication could also mean he did
not "knowingly" sign the deed even if he had in fact signed it, but had forgotten he
had. (See Brief of Appellee at 10-11.) The state argues that if the defense
emphasized Elmer Butler's drinking they were in danger of demonstrating his
defective memory and trembling hand, at the cost of showing that he had not
knowingly signed the deed. However, the intoxicated state of Elmer Butler is not
6

the double edged sword the State characterizes it as. If Elmer Butler had signed
the deed, but without sufficient mental clarity to constitute a "knowing" act, then
that showing exonerates the defendants of criminal culpability and raises only a
possibility that a civil claim exists. If it is a double edged sword then one side is
extremely dull.
There are actually two issues present in regard to Elmer Butler's
intoxication: first, is whether intoxication could have affected Elmer Butler's
signature; and second, whether intoxication affected his memory so that after
signing the deed he did not remember doing so.
Testimony was given at trial that Elmer Butler was frequently intoxicated.
Prosecution witness Marilyn Goldberg testified that Jimmie Butler had said Elmer
was drunk when he signed the deed. (R.463: 69) The question of whether the
simulation of Elmer Butler's signature could have been made by Elmer Butler
while intoxicated was never raised openly by the defense. However, it is an
obvious question because there would be obvious similarity between a "drunken"
signature and a "sober" one from the same person. Never-the-less, defense
counsel at trial ignored this obvious opportunity. He did not explore the issue at
all with prosecution expert Throckmorton, probably because his pre-trial
preparations for such exploration were inadequate. A competent attorney would
have determined the answer to the question by independent expert prior to trial. (
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) "the Sixth Amendment
imposes on counsel a duty to investigate, because reasonably effective
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assistance must be based on professional decisions and informed legal choices
can be made only after investigation of options.") Even if he had failed to make
proper pre-trial preparations, the defense had nothing to lose by questioning
Throckmorton regarding drunk versus sober signatures and everything to gain.
Counsel should have done so.
Elmer Butler's assertion that he had not signed the deed (R.463: 69) was
bolstered by expert forensic handwriting analyst Throckmorton's testimony of a
"high probability" the questioned signature was a "simulated forgery". (id.:115.) In
other words, an elderly old man who couldn't remember his name, age, and
address states the signature on the deed is not his and then a reputable expert in
handwriting analysis, who testifies about such things for the state, supports his
testimony. Without that support the jury probably would have viewed Elmer
Butler's testimony very differently. Contrary to the State's claim in its brief, the
defense did not need to badger an elderly old man who the jury felt sympathy for.
(See Appellee Brief at 13.) They simply needed to explore in a courteous and
direct way the alcoholism, intoxication, and memory failings of Elmer Butler
coupled with qualifying or erasing the support expert witness Throckmorton's
testimony contributed.
It is not enough for this court to examine each of the deficiencies of trial
counsel individually. The deficiencies of counsel should be viewed in their totality.
(Washington v. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) "the performance inquiry must be
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the
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circumstances." (See also Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1988))
[Bold emphasis added.]

Point 3

"'.

EVIDENCE VIEWED IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
JURY'S VERDICT IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
DEFENDANTS COMMITTED BURGLARY. IT IS ALSO
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN VERDICTS FOR FORGERY AND
THEFT.

The State cited "BURGLAh
Rri"l "I Ap|ip||"i',il \(\) Sinr

*' •• v

its heading to Point Two in its brief. (See
loes not involve such a charge the

reference is inapplicable.
is bneT, tne State argues that the defendants "have not marshaled the
evidp

-> verdict. " 'See Brief of Appellee at 1 /.) Let us use the

forgery statute under which the defendants were convicted (see U.C.A. §76-6.., . Tramework tu uxainim. NIL, I I HIM I

n n I inn Ii i lln

,l,ilule Miliar

Butler's signature on the warranty deed in question in this case must be prover, to
be:
d simulation;
•

Elmer Butler "testified at trial that his signature was forged on the
deed and that it was not his signature..." (See Brief of Appellan* ~x

•

I xpert witness Throckmorton testified "Elmer's signature was a
9

simulated forgery." (See Brief of Appellant at 8).

... i . .

•,-...

,•

,M.

i.

'.QQQ-

i

The deed was signed April 23, 1999. (See Brief of Appellant at 6).

•

The deed was recorder by Anita Butler. (See Brief of Appellant at
i i : ••

.

3 in Iron County;
•

f h e deed was recorded in the It • : \ i Coi u i1:\ i tecoi dei s Office ii i :: |: i il
of 2001 (See Brief of Appellant at 6).

4 purports to be the act of Elmer Butler.
•

I

transferring his interest in the home. (See Brief of Appellant at 6).

without authority from Elmer Butler; and
!

•

' *

testified at ti i at. I tl lat he "did [not] authorize anyone to

sign the deed on his behalf."(See Brief of Appellant at 6).
•

Elmer Butler testified at tiK.il tl i,il it was unlikely Edna Butler signed
the • jeecl oi i his behalf."(See Brief of Appellant at 6).

6 had either a purpose to defraud or knew they were facilitating a fraud.

•

:

1 • : 'i g e c i d e e ' :ii s igned transferring Elmer Bi Jtler's interest ii I his home

(See Brief of Appellant at 6).
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•

Elmer Butler received no compensation for the deed. (See Brief of
Appellant at 6).

However, the six elements foregoing are not the issue with respect to either
of the defendants' post trial motions nor are they the issue of this portion of their
11111

„iI I I 1 I i

I f • I i»mi ni *. i, i I i. i s 11 in 11 f Il II 11 ni 11 f i l l • 11 " 11 i 111 " mi I mi ni ni mi mi i i (-" s | ) P f • I I n I h P S P

elements it is irrelevant since, as the defendant's argued in their memorandum in
support of their motion for a new trial, even if all this is proven the final and

i. who did the forgery or uttered the forgery with the requisite purpose or
knowledge?
. 3 Appellants ,

. .

d

have made conclusions that Jimmie Butler and/or Anita Butler made or uttered
the forgery with the necessary mental state. In its brief the State also argued that
III II

IcieiHJainh ' '

inferences." (See Brief of Appellee at 18). Therefore, as to each item of
circumstantial evidence the defense will point out the flaws in inferring guilt.

RULES OF LAW REGARDING CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND
INFERENCES
An inference upon an inference is conjecture.
"the juiy I lad to indulge an inference upon an inference that could lead but to
conjecture not justifying a conclusion that a theft was accomplished by both or
either of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of any
11

reasonable hypothesis other than theft." {State v. George, 481 P.2d 667, 25 Utah
2d 330) [Bold emphasis added.]
A criminal conviction may not be based upon conjecture or probabilities.
"A criminal conviction may not be based upon conjectures, however true, nor
upon probabilities, however strong, but rather a conviction must be supported by
a quantum of evidence sufficient to logically compel the conclusion of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.(fn8) Although this Court recognizes circumstantial
evidence may be as convincing as direct evidence in support of a criminal
conviction we also recognize where a conviction is based on circumstantial
evidence that evidence should be looked upon with caution.(fn9) Circumstances
when presented as evidence in a criminal conviction must do more than merely
cause a strong presumption of guilt.(fnlO) Rather when they are relied upon for a
conviction, they ought to be of such a character as to negate every reasonable
hypothesis except that of the defendant's quilt;' (State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229).
An inference of guilt must exclude every inference of innocence.
1i Carter v. State, supra, the court questioned the soundness of the rule that an
inference cannot be based upon another inference and stated: "Conceding it to
be so [that the rule is of doubtful validity], yet it is nevertheless true that where, in
a criminal case, a certain fact, such as the recent possession of stolen goods in a
prosecution for larceny, is relied on, and is not directly proved, but is to be
inferred from circumstances, those circumstances should be such as to exclude
every reasonable inference except that the defendant was actually in the
possession of the goods alleged in the indictment to have been stolen."' (State v.
Hall, 139 P.2d 228, 105 Utah 151) [Bold emphasis added.]
A circumstantial case requires exclusion of every reasonable

hypothesis

other than guilt.
"The rule often applied in a circumstantial case that requires the exclusion of
every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt is in reality nothing more than
another manner of stating the burden of proof applicable in all criminal cases,
viz., beyond a reasonable doubt. The key word in either concept is that of
"reasonable. ..Circumstantial evidence may be quite as conclusive as direct
evidence, but it is incumbent upon the prosecution, not only to show. . . that the
alleged facts and circumstances are true, but they must also be such facts and
circumstances as are incompatible, upon any reasonable hypothesis, with
the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any
reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt".(State v. Lamm, 606
P.2d 229.) [Bold emphasis added.]
12

Possession or uttering alone insufficient to infer guilt
"But there should be some facts or circumstances from which an inference can
logically be drawn before the defendant can be required to mount a defense and
prove his lack of knowledge or intent.3
We do not think it proper to infer knowledge that an instrument is forged
from its mere possession or uttering.(fn6) The act of possessing a forged
instrument and attempting to utter it can be an innocent act which, standing
alone, should not automatically give rise to an inference of guilty knowledge. See
Pearson v. State, 8 Md.App. 79, 258 A.2d 917, 921-22 (Md.Ct.Spec.App.1969).
But see Bieber v. State, 8 Md.App. 522, 261 A.2d 202, 209 & n. 8
(Md.Ct.Spec.App.1970) (limiting scope of Pearson) If the prosecution can
present no other facts or circumstances to create such additional suspicion as
would warrant the inference, there is insufficient evidence from which the jury can
reasonably infer knowledge or intent" {State v. Kihlstrom, 988 P.2d 949 (UT App.
1999)) [Bold emphasis added.]

Marshaling of Evidence and Refutations of Guilty Inferences
-

The signatures of Jimmie and Anita Butler were on

K ^ ^

vSee

What could the jury infer from Jimmie and Anita Butler's signatures on the
deed that could support their verdict of guilty? They could infer that their
I ilui. •• i illii'Mtii i i t n l Hi. MIII -1

h

f r i r w r Butler's r.iqnnturr Rut n,rr thry

justified in doing so?

3 The Court noted - "At oral argument, we explored with counsel several situations in which one might utter
a forged instrument in complete innocence. For example, someone may accept a check from a stranger
at a garage sale in payment for an old lamp, cash the check, and later be charged with the uttering variant
of forgery because the check proves to have been stolen and forged. It seems peculiar to permit the State
to satisfy the prima facie case requirement by allowing fraudulent intent on the part of the lamp seller to be
inferred merely because she dealt with an instrument later shown to be fraudulent. It is no answer to
suggest that the vendor could take the stand and establish her innocence. Very simply, she should be
back home rummaging through the garage getting ready for the next sale rather than spending the day in
court and being put to the burden of hiring counsel. In our justice system, the prosecution must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt; the defendant need not prove innocence. And the defendant, whether guilty
or innocent, is privileged to remain silent. An inference that springs from thin air lessens the prosecution's
burden while chilling the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege."
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Was the simulated signature of Elmer Butler even on the deed when
Jimmie and Anita Butler signed
Hi

In Mil iiiilii'.riil

ire is no evidence that it was other than that

Hi.(ill Hit" ".if iiiii-nil! mi

I Hi

Ill-nil I (n I'tirp flif sin iqi ilar) \ \/;v".

"signed in the presence of" Jimmie Butler. However, similar evidence exists
against notary Kent Peterson and Mr. Peterson testified he did not even
mini in in in ni I in in in in i i. in mi/mi in I Hi

' II

Ill I I i"

mi ni I il Ill Il mi I I '-i 'I "i Hi, il i I I I I I in i in i * I i i il I I I 1'. M i'|i i, ni I mi mi mi

was authenticating only Anita Butler's and Edna Mae Butler's signatures (or one
or the other's), which were both validated by expert witness Throckmorton. I he
f IIII,11 in • L hi< h Jnnnii

1 ''"iili'i""'" " 1'IIMIMI

w;is ph' < 1

nH I n „ " 1 ""ii h r

authenticating any of the three signatures or any combination thereof. On its face
it is equally incriminating or innocent. Innocence is the presumption the ji iry

If Jimmie Butler's signature was authenticating only Anita Butler's
signature, then why would he do that when she is not the grantor? What could the

would justify a guilty verdict? They could infer that Jimmie and Anita were using
notary Peterson to place his seal on a document which they would then add to • ;~'

"

However thh ,c. nc - the only

reasonable inference. If two (or more) inferences exist and are equally probable
then if one is innocent, the presumption f innocence holds sway.
It in in IIII list be remembered that this case ^ * * "

* irms length dealings

between strangers, it is completely within a family. Families deal within the family
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differently than can be expected of outside dealings. The following dialogue
between Judge J. Philip Eves and prosecute

oy Little immediately prior to

Opt 1 iiiifHJ s l r j f e r P P l ill" i III M i l ' I'Vist' I', l l l l l ' . l l . ilh/i '

Judge Eves:"Let me just make a suggestion to you - Suppose that my wife and I
are going to convey some property away to somebody and,
uh, I'm busy at work, she has time to go down to the notary
public to get her signature notarized and I tell her, you know,
while you're there write my name in. Is It a Forgery?
Attorney Little:
"It's not a forgery, r10."
Judge Eves: "And so, where's the intent to defraud?"
Attorney Little:
Yeh, well that's not the case here."
Judge Eves: But the question is where is the intent to defraud in that case?
notary may have been misled if in fact I intended for my
signature to go on that document for the transfer to take place
- there is no fraud."
(R.463: 26-271

The signature of Edna Butler is on the deed also and was authenticated by
expert Throckmorton as "strong probability". It is reasonable to infer that Jimmie
.in mi i Ill ni ni i I .,1 I l i ni I I 1 1

n
i mi mi in. nl< it ni i ill

i i ".mi ni I mi I • . i I l u l l mi I Il mi I I! Il i mi I III H," i si ii 1 Hie

document. Edna was elderly and iI lay not have wanted to go to the trouble of
going to an office to execute a deed. She may have had Jimmie and Anita bring
I ni

so it would be convenient for her. < »r .i is possible she wanted it done this way so
she could simulate Elmer Butler's signature unknown to Jimmie and Anita (and
• •

I >e

unlikely with the notary seal and Edna's valid signature.
The fact that Edna had power of attorney for Elmer (a fact not presented at
15

trial) also makes this scenario an even more reasonable inference based upon
the facts. In fact, considering the power of attorney (which both prosecution and
defense

/ it1 .i iin

HIIOIIK

Ill, i! 111• i!•.*•i• .iNninc

not the case here" an inaccurate observatio;..

!

Il illlf'f slntfIIIPIII fh.il "this r.

lis case indeed shares the critical

similarities with Judge Eves hypothetical scenario. As noted above, with Edna

Edna Butler, the teeth are pulled from the prosecution's case - what need would
Jimmie and Anita Butler have to forge the deed? They have no motive because

Elmer as well. As Judge Eves asked, "here's the intent to defraud?" (Id.)
The facts of Jimmie Butler's and Anita Butler's signatures on the deed,

Butler on it, can support an inference that the defendants knew of or participated
in the forgery. But their signatures can equally be innocent or even infer they
' W f l l i f ' U S f t l l »IS | ) < ! A I I S , .III11. Ill i|.

liM'.MII lllil

Il III.II

Il

Ill

Il .III". Illlllf

SfPn.llin

suggested by Judge Eves. The signature of Edna Mae Butler on the deed could
also infer she knew or participated in simulating Elmer Butler's signature.
Il II

f i MI in

ni I

11 mi i ill i l l i HI mi ni i •,/ i | . i .11 I in mi ni I mi 1 I i n l , I

mi ill ni 11 HI II 111 in n
i Mill If i if •

she did simulate his signature or if a simulation was made under her direction
then I lo ciime occurred. .> ,*., jury was bound to the presumption of innocence and

Jimmie Butler said Elmer Butler signed the deed. (See Brief of
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Appellant at 7).
According to Marilyn Goldberg's testimony at trial, Jimmie Butler asserted
to her that Elmer Butler signed the deed when he was drunk. What the jury could
infer from this is that by so stating, Jimmie Butler was authenticating the forgery
on the deed by stating as fact what was arguably proven as untrue at trial.
However, another just as reasonable inference could be made - an innocent one.
It could be inferred that Jimmie Butler was evidencing his lack of knowledge of
the forgery. The statement could just as easily be taken as a statement of belief
rather than knowledge. If Edna Butler had made the simulation of Elmer Butler's
signature and informed Jimmie that it was actually Elmer's signature, made while
in a state of intoxication, then Jimmie's assertion of this falsity is simply a
statement of sincere (albeit false) belief, not an expression of knowledge. The
innocent inference, as reasonable as any other, was obligatory upon the jury.
•

Anita Butler had the deed recorded. (See Brief of Appellant at 11).

Prosecution witness Elmer Butler stated that"... my son Jimmie and his
wife, got papers notarized and sent, uh, to the recorder's office to take my home
away from me. They said it was theirs." In fact, the defendants' attorney
stipulated to the prosecution's proffered testimony of Patsy Cutler that defendant
Anita Butler submitted the deed for recording. The deed itself has printed on it
under the recorder's name (Patsy Cutler), number, book, page, date and fee the
statement: "REQUEST: ANITA MAE BUTLER". These statements directly accuse
the defendants of uttering the deed which the jury believed was forged. The
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inference the jury could make is that if they uttered it they must know what it is or
they were uttering it with the purpose to defraud. However, with the valid
signature of Edna Butler on the deed an equally or even more reasonable
inference is that the defendants were merely recording what they believed was a
gift from Edna and Elmer Butler, absent knowledge that Elmer's signature was a
simulation and absent purpose to defraud. The reasonable inference of
innocence is required if the standard of beyond reasonable doubt is honored.
•

Jimmie and Anita Butler benefited from the deed. (See Brief of
Appellant at 6).

The inference from this is that the defendants had a motive to forge Elmer
Butler's name on the deed. From this it would be inferred that they actually did so.
However, these inferences weaken considerably when it is noted that Edna Mae
Butler did sign the deed herself and that she also had power of attorney to sign for
Elmer. In fact, Elmer Butler testified it was possible she did this. (R.463: 48). The
inference from Edna Mae Butler's signature on the deed is that she also had motive
to sign for Elmer Butler. She apparently wished to convey the property to her
daughter-in-law Anita Butler. Again, the jury should be held to an equally plausible
inference of innocence.
•

The notarization on the deed was not valid. (See Brief of Appellant at
7-8).

The testimony of Notary Kent Peterson implies that the deed in question is not
valid and that the signatures thereon were not notarized by him. The inference from
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this is that the defendants (whose signatures were on the deed) were behind this
chicanery and did so to perpetrate and conceal their crime. However, as in the
hypothetical posed by Judge Eves, described above, an innocent motive could just
as easily be ascribed to this fact.
•

Jimmie and Anita Butler are son and daughter-in-law, respectively, to
Elmer Butler. (See Brief of Appellant at 7, 9).

The inference from these relationships is that the defendants were familiar
with Elmer Butler's signature and in position to allow them to forge his name. It is
reasonable to infer that Jimmie and Anita Butler, as close family members of Elmer
Butler, would likely be familiar with Elmer Butler's signature or at least have access
to documents with his signature on it. However, Jimmie and Anita Butler were not the
only ones empowered by relationship and familial interaction to be able to have
access and familiarity with Elmer Butler's signature. It appears obvious that Edna
Butler would also be in such a position. Again, an equally plausible inference that
points to innocence must be chosen.
•

Elmer Butler's signature was forged on the deed by someone with
access to or familiarity with his signature. (See Brief of Appellant at
8-9).

The testimony or expert Throckmorton narrows the field of who could have
simulated Elmer Butler's signature. The jury could infer that Jimmie and Anita
Butler did the simulation because, as noted immediately preceding, they had
access to or were familiar with Elmer Butler's signature. However, a similar and
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equally plausible inference could just as easily be made toward Edna Mae Butler.
The inference toward innocence of the defendants should have been chosen.
•

Anita Butler secured a loan on the deeded house. (See Brief of
Appellant at 8).

Although this act demonstrates control over the property in question and could
be evidence of theft as a follow-up to forgery, such a showing would first require a
showing of knowledge that the property was that of another. No such showing exists.
In fact, the action is consistent with a good faith belief the property is hers. An
inference of guilty knowledge or purpose to defraud cannot be made when equally
plausible innocent purposes are present. If Anita Butler had no knowledge of fraud or
forgery then it would be reasonable for her to act as she did. There is no such
showing of a guilty mind.
•

Jimmie and Anita Butler simply took the house. (See Brief of
Appellant at 6).

The same argument as the preceding paragraph applies here also.
•

Jimmie and Anita Butler attempted to sell the house. (R.464: 201202. Not found in the Brief of Appellant).

The same argument as the preceding paragraph applies here also.

CONCLUSION
In the arguments above the defendants have refuted the State's claims that
they had not shown the assistance of their trial counsel ineffective. If trial counsel
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had introduced the power of attorney granting Edna Mae Butler authority to sign
documents on behalf of Elmer Butler it would not have undermined the defendants
case and would in fact have bolstered their claims of innocence and probably led to
a different verdict. The failure to introduce the document is not excused by any
reasonable trial tactic or strategy and the failure to introduce it constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel.
The defendants brief in this appeal did marshal the evidence upon which the
jury could have relied to reach a guilty verdict. The defendants did not ignore
circumstantial evidence and the inferences which flowed from it. The defendants
have demonstrated that all essential elements to reach guilty verdicts against them
were not present.
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the defendants respectfully request this
Court to overturn the Judgment and enter other such orders as this Court deems
appropriate.
DATED this 16th day of August, 2007.

MICHAEL W. ISBELL (6577)
Attorney for Jimmie and Anita Butler
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MICHAEL W. ISBELL

22

Addendum ~A~
Power of Attorney
From Elmer Butler To Edna Mae Butler,
Dated December 8, 1964.
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POWER OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That ELMER L. BUTLER has made, constituted and appointed,
and by these presents does hereby make, constitute and appoint
EDNA MAE BUTLER, his wife, of Kingman, Arizona, ny true and
lawful attorney for and in my nane, place and stead and for my
use and benefit, to ask, demand, sue for, recover, collect and
receive all such SUITS of money, debts, accounts, interests,
dividends and demands whatsoever, as are now or shall hereafter
become due, owing, payable or belonging to me; and, have, use and
take all lawful ways or means in my name, or otherwise, for the
recovery thereof, by legal process, and to compromise and agree
for the same, and grant acquitance or other sufficient discharges
for the same for me and in my name, to make, seal and deliver; to
bargain, contract, agree for, purchase, receive and take lands
and accept the possessing of all lands and all deeds and ether
i assurances in the law thereof; and, to lease, let, sell, remise,
release, convey and mortgage lands, upon such terms and conditions
and under such covenants as she shall think fit.

Also to bargain

and agree for, buy, sell, nortgage and in anv and everv way and
manner deal in and with goods, wares and merchandise, choses in
action, and other property in possession or in action; and, to
make? do and transact all and every kind of business of what
nature and kind soever; and, also, for and in my name, and as mv
act and deed, to sign, seal, execute, deliver and acknowledge such
deeds, covenants, indentures, agreements, mortgages, notes,
receipts, evidences of debt, releases and satistaction ot mortgage, judgment and other debts, and such other instruments in
ANK X GORDOf
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N6MAN

ARllQhA

writing, of whatever kind and nature, as nay he necessary or
proper in the premises.
GIVING AND GRANTING unto my said Attorney full power and
authority to do and perform all and every act and thing whatsoever
requisite and necessary to be done in and about the premises, as
fully to ail intents and purposes as I might or could do if
personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that my
said Attorney, EDNA MAE BUTLER, shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue of these presents.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 8th
day of December, 1964«
'-y^K. - "x , ^ ^
ELMER L. BUTLER
STATE OF ARIZONA)
) §
COUNTY OF MOHAVE)
On this the 8th day of December, 1964, before ne? Frank XGordon, the undersigned officer, personally appeared ELMER L.
BUTLER, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to
the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed
the same for the purposes therein contained.
.. y;\pi WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my__hand and official seal.
rt: * r
My' CQYissiission expires

Notarv Public

Mar^.-l, 1966.
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